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I. INTRODUCTION
Women have the right to terminate their pregnancies,1 although it is neither
absolute nor free from numerous attempts to be abolished or to be significantly
limited.2 Attempts to regulate pregnancy have also affected women’s rights to make
decisions concerning the refusal of medical procedures.3 In In re Brown,4 the Illinois
court appointed a guardian to protect the interests of a fetus and ordered a pregnant
woman to undergo a blood transfusion against her will.5 In 2004, Melissa Rowland
refused to undergo a cesarean section. Doctors claim that her refusal resulted in the
stillbirth of one of her fetuses.6 She became the first pregnant woman arrested for
homicide because of her behavior during pregnancy.7
1

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

2

See generally Human Rights Watch, U.S. Abortion Regulations Undermine Women’s
Right to Choose, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/27/usdom14469.htm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2006).
3

Id.

4

In re Brown, 689 N.E. 2d. 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).

5

SHEENA MEREDITH, POLICING PREGNANCY 45 (Ashgate 2005) [hereinafter Meredith].

6

See Monica Miller, Refusal to Undergo a Cesarean Section: A Woman’s Right or A
Criminal Act? 15 HEALTH MATRIX 383, 400 (2005) [hereinafter Miller].
7

Id. at 383.
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State courts vary in their willingness to protect pregnant women’s rights to selfdetermination, bodily integrity, privacy, and religious freedom; these rights are
sometimes outweighed by fetal rights to live.8 Different state courts have issued
many competing decisions, which emphasizes a lack of unification in this area of
law.9 This inconsistency in the law creates confusion for women concerning the
scope of their legal protections and alters women’s selection of prenatal care and
decision to give birth. Thus, it is important to recognize the prevailing themes and
grounds on which courts have rested their opinions.
An analysis of these state court rulings will expose a lack of unification among
states’ interests in protecting either women’s rights or fetal rights. This article will
first identify the factors that courts have used in their rulings; these are the factors
that judges most often have used to support or limit pregnant women’s constitutional
rights. A psycho-legal analysis then examines the effects of inconsistent rulings on
women, the medical profession, and the law. The concluding section will provide
recommendations for pregnant women and offer policy suggestions.
II. FACTORS INFLUENCING LEGAL RULINGS
A number of recent court cases emphasize inconsistencies in the law concerning
pregnant women’s rights and fetal rights.10 Some courts recognize fetal rights at
viability,11 whereas other courts sustain a mother’s overriding right to refuse any
medical treatment during the entire pregnancy.12 Fetal rights are based on the state’s
compelling interest to protect human life, especially at viability, and on recognition
of a fetus as a person under particular state laws.13 Most state courts reference the
provisions of Roe v. Wade14 that refer to “viability” as the point at which the state has
a compelling interest in protecting fetal rights to live and be born healthy.15 Not all
courts, however, have referred to the point of viability as the premise for their

8

See generally In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), reprinted
as an appendix to In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.
S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
9

See generally Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E. 2d 355 (Ill. 1988) (ruling in favor of the
mother’s right to refuse medical treatment); In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (ordering a
pregnant woman to undergo a cesarean section).
10
See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that a
pregnant woman’s right to refuse a medical treatment is absolute); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Morgan, 201 A.2d. 537 (N.J. 1964) (articulating that the state’s
interest in protecting a viable fetus outweighs a mother’s right to refuse medical treatment).
11

See Nold v. Binyon, 31 P.3d 274 (Kan. 2001); People v. Taylor, 32 Cal. 4th 863, 883
(Cal. 2004).
12

In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. at 332, following Stallman, 125 Ill.2d at 223 (this
rationale refers to pregnant women’s right to refuse invasive medical treatment which does not
diminish during pregnancy).
13

See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 391.

14

See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

15

Meredith, supra note 5, at 41.
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rulings.16 In a few cases, the judges noted the state’s compelling interest in protecting
the life of a not-yet-viable fetus.17
The prevailing factors on which courts rest their holdings about pregnant
women’s rights to refuse medical treatment can be grouped into categories based on
common themes. Identifying these themes will emphasize the factors on which
courts base their opinions and how these opinions affect pregnant women’s rights
and fetal rights. These factors include self-determination, bodily integrity, privacy,
free exercise of religion, and the protection of a woman’s health and life. The
remainder of this section will focus on each of the major factors that judges have
relied on in their rulings.
A. Pregnant Women’s Right to Self-Determination and Bodily Integrity
A right to control one’s body is an issue of one’s autonomy, and typically the
state is not allowed to interfere in these intimate, personal decisions.18 The
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the right to bodily
integrity.19 A right to self-determination is protected under the common law,20 and it
is supported by the doctrine of informed consent.21 Individuals have a right to refuse
to subordinate their rights to the rights of others, even in order to save another
person’s life.22 This provides a competent adult with the right to refuse to consent to
any medical treatment being performed on him or her.23
Courts that have heard cases concerning the pregnant woman’s right to refuse
medical treatment have discussed such rights.24 Several courts established the legal
importance of a pregnant woman’s rights to self-determination and refusal of an

16

See generally Mark Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 L., MED.,
114-129 (1989) [hereinafter Field].

AND HEALTH CARE

17
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 837, 846 (1992); In re
Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
18
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(discussing individuals’ constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
19

The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in section 1, states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20

See Meredith, supra note 5, at 6.

21

Id. at 7.

22

See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d. 90 (Allegheny Cp. Ct. 1978) (opining that an
individual is not obligated to undergo a medical procedure to benefit another person).
23
24

See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).

See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. 457 (Ga. 1981);
In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), reprinted as an appendix to
In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. 326 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994)
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invasive medical treatment based on the “reasonable man” standard.25 The
“reasonable man” standard originated in the development of the common law.26 This
standard concerns the ability of an individual to act sensibly (e.g., making a
reasonable decision whether to undergo a medical procedure).27 Pregnancy does not
prevent women from adhering to this standard; thus, pregnant women have the full
capacity to make decisions for themselves, including the decision to refuse or
consent to any medical treatment.
This approach is reflected in the court ruling in Mercy Hospital v. Jackson.28 In
this case, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals denied a hospital’s request for
appointment of a guardian for a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness who refused a blood
transfusion during a cesarean section.29 The court’s reasoning was based on a
competent individual’s right to bodily integrity. Similarly, in In re Baby Boy Doe,
the judge ruled that a woman’s right to refuse an invasive medical procedure, such as
a cesarean section, does not diminish during pregnancy; thus it is absolute.30
The right of a pregnant woman to self-determination was the focus of the In re
Brown case.31 In this case, a pregnant woman lost a lot of blood during surgery; the
doctors recommended a blood transfusion, but she refused.32 The trial court ordered
the transfusion to be administered, but the appellate court ruled differently,
articulating that the state may not overrule a competent woman’s decision to refuse
medical treatment in order to save the life of her fetus.33 The judge also stated that a
blood transfusion is an invasive medical procedure that interferes with bodily
integrity.34
Some courts have even noted that pregnant women do not face civil liabilities for
hurting their fetuses.35 The court in Stallman v. Youngquist enunciated the right of a
pregnant woman to reject medical treatment, even if it will result in jeopardizing her
health and life, and the life and welfare of her fetus.36 In this case, the Illinois
Supreme Court refused to recognize a mother’s liability for prenatal injuries to her

25
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d. 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing the
“reasonable man” standard for informed consent).
26

See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 E.R. 490 (C. P. 1837).

27
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (Pocket Ed. 3rd 2006) (defining a “reasonable
person” as one who “acts sensibly”).
28

Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d. 1130, 1134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).

29

Id. at 1134.

30

See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d. at 326.

31

In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d. at 398-99, 404-05.

32

Id. at 398.

33

Id. at 400.

34

Id. at 405.

35

See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).

36

Id. at 356.
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fetus.37 The court reasoned that such claims would expose mothers to unreasonable
state scrutiny and would violate the right to bodily integrity.38
In contrast, the Washington, D.C. court in In re A.C. reached the opposite
conclusion regarding a pregnant woman’s right to refuse invasive medical
treatment.39 There a young woman was pregnant when doctors discovered that her
cancer had returned. She became seriously ill before the fetus was born. Although
some of the doctors doubted that the child would live and predicted that a cesarean
delivery will hasten the mother’s death, the court ordered the cesarean surgery in an
attempt to save the child.40 The child died within two hours after the delivery, and the
mother died two days later.41
These few examples illustrate the inconsistencies among states. The obligation of
a pregnant woman to comply with doctors’ advice to undergo a particular medical
treatment conflicts with her right to self-determination and bodily integrity. Courts
disagree as to whether the pregnant woman’s rights or the rights of the fetus should
prevail.42 This is the same situation for women’s right to privacy.
B. Pregnant Women’s Right to Privacy
A pregnant woman has a fundamental right to privacy under Canterbury v.
Spence and Stallman v. Youngquist.43 In some cases of pregnant women rights to
privacy, state courts have issued opinions based on the Ninth Amendment.44
Although the Constitution does not articulate the right to privacy, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut determined that this right is one of the
“unenumerated” rights protected by the Ninth Amendment.45 The Griswold Court
emphasized the significance of the right to privacy concerning individuals’ decisions
to bear a child.46
Some pregnant women have refused medical treatment based on the right to
privacy.47 In Taft v. Taft,48 the Massachusetts Court of Appeals disregarded a lower
37

Id.

38

Id. (basing its rationale on a pregnant woman’s right to privacy, self determination, and
religious freedom).
39

In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1235, 1237 (D.C 1990).

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re A.C., 573 A.2d. at

1235.
43

See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d. 772, (D.C. Cir. 1972); Stallman, 531N.E.2d. 355
(rejecting the perspective that pregnant women’s rights are subordinated to fetal rights); Alan
John Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 39
CREIGHTON L. REV 849 (2006) [hereinafter Cohan].
44

“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const. amend. IX.
45

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

46

Id.

47

See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. 457 (Ga. 1981).
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court’s order that required a woman in her fourth month of pregnancy to undergo an
invasive medical procedure.49 The Court held that there were no compelling
circumstances to justify overriding her right to privacy.50
In other cases, judges have overruled pregnant women’s rights, declaring that the
fetal rights to live and to be born healthy outweigh the mother’s rights.51 For
instance, the court in In re A.C. chose not to uphold the incompetent woman’s right
to privacy (against the dissent’s objections) and instead determined that the decision
could be made by a guardian who could be appointed to make the decision whether
the procedure should be performed.52 As the dissent points out, overruling the
mother’s wishes potentially violated her privacy rights.53
Some appellate courts have overruled lower courts’ decisions to force a woman
to undergo medical procedure. For instance, the Taft court vacated a lower court’s
decision, finding that forced medical procedures violate the mother’s privacy.54 Even
though the courts recognize the importance of individuals’ right to privacy, they
sometimes significantly limit this right for pregnant women.55 Another restricted
right is the right to freely exercise one’s religion.
C. Pregnant Women’s Right to Free Exercise of Religion
When a competent adult declines medical treatment on religious grounds, the
courts generally respect his or her wishes, even in a life-or-death situation.56
However, if a state can demonstrate a compelling interest that would justify
overriding the right to free exercise of religion, a court may limit this constitutional
right. At the point of fetal viability, the state’s interest becomes compelling, thus a
judge may overrule a pregnant woman’s right to freely exercise her religion.57
A host of cases have considered a pregnant woman’s right to free exercise of
religion.58 In some instances, the woman’s religious rights have prevailed. The court
in Mercy Hospital v. Jackson came to such a conclusion.59 In this case, a pregnant
48

Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d. 395 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983).

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

See Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. 457; In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611
(D.C. 1987).
52

See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1235, 1258.

53

Id. at 1248

54

Taft,446 N.E.2d.395.

55

See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235.

56

See Miller, supra note 6, at 387.

57

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Miller, supra note 6, at 389.

58

See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Morgan, 201 A.2d. 537 (N.J.
1964).
; In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).; Nold v. Binyon, 31 P.3d
274 (Kan. 2001); Taft, 446 N.E.2d. 395.
59

Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d. 1130, 1134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
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woman with the signs of premature labor agreed to a cesarean delivery, but she
refused to have a blood transfusion due to her religious beliefs.60 Although the
hospital tried to obtain a court order to administer the procedure, the judge said that a
competent adult has a right to refuse a blood transfusion based on religious grounds,
if it will not endanger the fetus.61
In contrast, some courts have refused to honor the woman’s religious rights. In
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Morgan, a pregnant woman
refused a blood transfusion due to her religious beliefs.62 The lower court refused to
intervene, but the Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the transfusion to save the
lives of both the mother and the fetus.63 In In re Jamaica Hospital, the court ordered
a blood transfusion to save the lives of a mother and her not-yet-viable fetus,
disregarding the woman’s religious objections.64 Similarly, in Crouse Irving
Memorial Hospital v. Paddock, a pregnant woman agreed to a cesarean section but
refused a blood transfusion based on her religious beliefs.65 The court ordered the
mother to receive blood transfusions as necessary for the survival of her fetus,
despite her objections.66
In the majority of cases, courts have significantly limited a pregnant women’s
Constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.67 Even those state courts which
issued opinions protecting pregnant women’s religious right have added stipulations
that a pregnant woman’s religious freedom may be respected if it does not conflict
with endangering her fetus.68 Consequently, the right to free exercise of religion is
neither absolute nor well protected.
D. Pregnant Women’s Right to Protect Their Health and Lives
Pregnant women who consent to a cesarean section assume numerous health risks
associated with this procedure. Cesarean birth is a major surgery that may result in
infection of the bladder or kidneys, increased blood loss (twice as much as with
vaginal birth), decreased bowel functions, respiratory complications, and maternal
death. A cesarean section also presents possible complications to the infant, such as
premature birth, breathing problems, injury during the delivery, and infant lung
immaturity. This procedure is also associated with a longer hospital stay and
recovery time for women. There are long-term risks, too. For instance, the incision
scar could break open during a later pregnancy or labor. In addition, the placenta

60

Id. at 1134.

61

Id.

62

See Raleigh, 201 A.2d. at 537.
Id.

63
64

See In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d at 898-99; see also generally Cohan, supra note

65

Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

43.
1985).
66
67

Id. at 443, 445.

See Raleigh, 201 A.2d. 537; In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y. S.2d. 898; Crouse Irving, 485
N.Y.S.2d. 443.
68
See, e.g., Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d. at 1130, 1134.
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could sink too low in the uterus and block the cervix, causing severe bleeding after
childbirth or necessitating a hysterectomy. In short, a cesarean section presents some
serious threats to a woman’s health.
Pregnant women’s rights to protect their own health and life precede the fetal
right to live, as outlined in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists and in Stallman v. Youngquist.69 In Thornburgh, the court offered
strong support for the mother’s right to refuse a risky medical procedure for the sake
of her fetus.70 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that the
statute providing for the protection of the life of a fetus before a woman’s health was
unconstitutional.71 Similarly, in Stallman, the court said that if a procedure would
compromise the health of the mother, the court will not overrule her refusal to
consent.72 A mother’s rights are superior to the rights of a fetus, and a woman’s
health cannot be subordinated to the state’s interest in preserving the potentiality of a
viable fetus.73
Some courts have forced invasive medical treatments on pregnant women,
ignoring the possible complications that could result in pregnant women’s loss of
life, health, psychological well-being, and self-worth.74 These court decisions were
based only on medical evaluations, which were not always accurate.75 The
inaccuracy of doctors’ diagnoses is demonstrated in cases such as In re Madyun and
In re Jamaica Hospital.76 In In re Madyun, the doctors stated that there was a big
chance of a fetal infection through a vaginal delivery, but after the forced cesarean
section was performed, there was no infection found.77 Obstetricians were also
incorrect in their diagnoses in Jefferson and In re Baby Boy Doe.78 In both cases, the
babies were born healthy, contrary to the doctors’ predictions that the babies would
die or be seriously harmed if they were not delivered through cesarean section.79 In
these cases, the pregnant women’s health was unnecessarily put at risk.

69
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69
(1986) (prohibiting the state from placing restrictions on abortions); Stallman v. Youngquist,
531 N.E. 2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
70

See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69.

71

Id. at 768-69.

72

See Stallman, 531 N.E. 2d at 333, 355.

73

Id. at 333, 355.

74

See generally Field, supra note 16.

75

See Miller, supra note 6, at 398; Meredith, supra note 5,at 64.

76

See In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), reprinted as an
appendix to In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d
898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
77

See Meredith, supra note 5, at 65.

78

See e.g., Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth, 274 S.E.2d. at 460 (the woman checked
out of the hospital and later gave birth to a healthy child to the contrary of the doctors’
diagnoses); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. at 326.
79

See generally Miller, supra note 6.
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Generally, state courts favor protecting pregnant women’s health. However,
courts have different opinions on how particular medical treatments may pose health
risks and how necessary they are to the delivery of a baby.80 When courts perceive
that a medical procedure, such as a blood transfusion or a cesarean section, presents
a minimal risk to the health of a pregnant woman, the judges order the treatment
despite the woman’s objections.81
E. Fetal and State Rights
The state has a compelling interest in protecting the potentiality of human life,
including the right of a viable fetus to be born alive and healthy. Many state courts
have protected the state’s interest because they determine that a fetus deserves the
state’s protection.82 Some courts have ruled that beyond the legal period of time
allowed for abortion, the state automatically has the power to protect the life and
health of a woman’s fetus.83 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the court has ruled that
the state has an interest in protecting the potentiality of human life from
conception.84 Thus, a pregnant woman’s rights are often balanced with the rights of
the fetus or of the state.
III. “BALANCING” THE RIGHTS OF A WOMAN AND THE FETUS
When determining the rights of the woman, the fetus and the state, courts have
used different rationales and have issued different decisions.85 Some courts have
emphasized the importance of applying a balancing test to determine whether a
pregnant woman can refuse an invasive medical procedure.86 In some cases, the
judges have articulated that in order to protect the life or health of a fetus, a cesarean
section or a blood transfusion is the least invasive procedure to be imposed on
pregnant women.87 In In re Madyun, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
authorized the imposition of an invasive medical treatment over the wish of a
pregnant woman.88 The court determined that fetal rights and a pregnant woman’s

80

See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747; In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d. at 898; Griffin
Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. at 457.
81
See, e.g., In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), reprinted as
an appendix to In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Brown, 689 N.E. 2d. 397
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
82

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

83

See Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

84

Id. at 837.

85

See, e.g., Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. at 460; Pemberton v.
Tallahassee Mem’l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d. 1247, 1251 (N.D. Fla. 1999).; In re Baby Boy
Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
86

See id.

87

See generally In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986),
reprinted as an appendix to In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Jamaica
Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
88

In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86.
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rights were not in conflict, despite the mother’s objections.89 The court also
characterized a cesarean section as a minimal risk to the mother in comparison to a
high risk to the fetus.90
Essentially, when recognizing the right of a pregnant woman to accept or reject
any medical procedures, courts have held that this right is not absolute.91 In a few
cases, the right of a pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment has been judicially
overridden.92 The court may either protect a pregnant woman’s rights or find that
they are outweighed by the state’s compelling interest in protecting the right of a
fetus to live.93 In Jefferson, the court held that the intrusion into the life of a mother
is outweighed by the duty of the state to protect a viable fetus from death.94 In In re
Jamaica, even though the state’s interest was not compelling because the fetus was
not viable, the court emphasized the significance of the state’s interest in protecting
the life of a fetus.95 In In re A.C., the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld
an order permitting doctors to perform a cesarean section on a pregnant terminally ill
woman based on the interest of the fetus, and it expanded the scope of permissible
intrusion into pregnancy.96
Other state court considered the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Stallman v. Youngquist, holding that a woman’s right to decide is more important
than fetal interests, and courts should not balance the maternal rights and fetal
rights.97 Perhaps Thornburg presents the strongest support for a pregnant woman’s
refusal of an invasive medical treatment.98 In this case, the court issued an opinion
supporting the superiority of a mother’s rights over the fetal rights by striking down
portions of an abortion law which required risking a mother’s health, by requiring a
certain type of abortion to be performed, to protect the fetus.99
As illustrated by these examples, the state courts have made a variety of opinions
concerning the rights of women to refuse medical treatment. Some courts have
determined that the women’s right is absolute, while other courts have concluded
that the woman’s rights are outweighed by the rights of the fetus or the state. Even
when courts find in favor of the mother, they rely on many different rationales,

89

Id.

90

Id.

91
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including the right to bodily integrity, right to religion, and the right to protect one’s
health. This variety of rulings has a number of effects.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF STATE COURT RULINGS
Court rulings have a number of effects on women, the medical system, and the
legal system. One serious consequence of court-ordered treatment is that pregnant
women may avoid the health care system, and thus will receive inadequate prenatal
care.100 For instance, a Jehovah’s Witness may decide to avoid going to a doctor for
fear that he or she will force her to have a blood transfusion or surgery that would
violate her religious beliefs. The lack of prenatal care may result in many
complications during pregnancy and childbirth, especially for women at-risk for
pregnancy and childbirth difficulties.101
Some women may make medical decisions based on their doctor’s willingness to
force them to undergo medical procedures. For instance, a woman may learn that her
regular doctor is likely to seek legal assistance to force her to undergo medical
treatment, and she may decide to change doctors to avoid this outcome.
Unfortunately, changing doctors may mean that the woman has to travel a great
distance or pay for medical care not covered by her insurance. Women may receive
significantly delayed, more expensive, and more time consuming prenatal care if
they are forced to shop for a doctor that will not force them to have procedures
which they find objectionable.
Some women are not afforded the ability of shopping for a doctor that will honor
their beliefs; sometimes women do not find out that their doctor plans to force
medical treatment on them until the issue comes up, such as when the doctor decides
a woman needs the medical treatment immediately. By this time, the doctor likely
will have sought the help of the courts to force a woman’s compliance, making it too
late for her to change doctors. Various state courts have ruled differently on the issue
of forced medical treatment. As a result, pregnant women are often unsure what
impact the law will have on their rights if they refuse an invasive medical procedure.
Cases arise under very different circumstances, leading to a variety of bases for
challenging the court order. Some courts have sided with the women, protecting their
rights to self determination, bodily integrity, privacy, free exercise of religion, and
health and life.102 Other courts have found that fetal rights or state interest outweighs
the mothers’ rights.103 A series of high-profile court cases have emphasized that
states are divided on this issue, which creates a problem for mothers, who do not
know what their rights are until a judge makes a ruling in a particular case.
Judicial intervention in pregnancy may also deprive women of their most basic
civil rights and threaten their recognition as competent individuals with the ability to
make their own treatment decisions.104 The legal control of pregnant women may
place all women of childbearing age at risk for governmental regulation of their
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behavior.105 It also poses a threat of creating a new class of individuals—pregnant
women—who are considered incompetent to make their own treatment decisions.
Frequently, judicial holdings have limited pregnant women’s constitutional
rights, and have regulated their freedom in making prenatal care choices.106 This may
have an impact on women’s reproductive health (e.g., cesarean sections may have
side-effects) and result in jeopardizing the life of the fetus (e.g., if the mother does
not seek prenatal care for fear of being forced to undergo an objectionable
procedure). The court rulings will also affect the medical system’s ability to care for
patients. Court rulings forcing women to have treatments may alienate women and
make them unwilling to turn to the medical profession. Court-ordered medical
procedures may alter the physician-patient relationship by creating distrust of
pregnant women toward their doctors. Mistrust may lead the woman to be unable to
confide in her doctor about her medical issues which could risk her health and her
fetus’ health. She may also refuse to follow her doctor’s advice if she does not trust
the doctor. Clearly, doctors can care for their patients better when there is a positive
doctor-patient relationship.
Court orders may also create a potential conflict between medical personnel
which could affect the quality of care they provide. One of the pregnant woman’s
doctors may support forcing the woman to have a particular medical procedure, but
other medical staff, such as the anesthesiologist or nurses, may not agree. If the court
orders the procedure, many medical personnel must be involved. This would force
some medical personnel to be active in a medical procedure they would not agree
with; almost certainly this would create hostility among hospital staff. Thus, the
debate affects the medical profession and its ability to care for patients.
As these examples illustrate, court rulings can affect pregnant women and the
medical profession. In order to avoid some of these negative outcomes, changes in
policy are necessary.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
As this analysis demonstrated, there is much disparity among court opinions
concerning the rights of pregnant women. Consequently, most women cannot be sure
of their rights, which could be confusing and stressful. Knowing the possibility of
forced medical treatment can have negative effects, such as avoidance of prenatal
care. Nevertheless, there are steps that can be taken to reduce the impact on women.
Some researchers propose that pregnant women should discuss the issue of
possible refusal of any invasive medical treatment with their doctors.107 Early in their
pregnancies, women could sign necessary forms supporting their wishes to decline
an unwanted medical treatment before any crisis that might occur. Doctors should
notify patients of their willingness, or lack thereof, to force women to undergo
medical treatments. This would allow them to find a different doctor who would not
force them to undergo a cesarean section or a blood transfusion if their own doctor
would not respect their preferences.108
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Unfortunately, not all women could be so proactive. Socio-economic
disadvantages, which prevent some women from accessing prenatal care, may not
allow them to voice their refusal of medical treatment in the delivery room. If a
pregnant woman refuses to consent to an invasive medical procedure upon delivery,
consents are sometimes obtained through court orders. In effect, doctors administer
cesarean sections or blood transfusions, and women can only appeal these judicial
decisions after the procedures have been already performed.109 Women who are in
hospitals do not always have the time to prepare a legal defense to protect their
rights, and they are often surprised that a doctor would not honor their refusal to
consent. Thus, it is unfair to surprise pregnant women with a legal dispute while they
are involved in a medical crisis. Although they can appeal the order later, it is too
late; the procedure has already been performed. Thus, instead of allowing emergency
orders, hospitals could take proactive steps to inform pregnant women of their rights
before a crisis arises.
Hospitals could establish specific guidelines for doctors and women. The policies
would clearly state the conditions, if any, on which doctors are allowed to seek court
orders to force women to have treatments against their will. The hospitals could also
inform pregnant women of their policies as early in the pregnancy as possible so
women can choose the hospital with a policy they accept. Doctors and other medical
personnel would also be able to choose a hospital that has policies consistent with
their personal preferences. For example, doctors who are willing to force a woman to
have medical treatment could seek employment at hospitals that allow them to seek
court orders. Such policies would prevent conflict created by the sudden court
proceedings.
States could adopt specific statutes to outline the rights of pregnant woman,
giving women notice of their rights during pregnancy. Specific guidelines could
indicate under what circumstances pregnant women can or cannot refuse an invasive
medical treatment. Doctors and hospitals would give pregnant women this
information as early in the pregnancy as possible so women could be better
informed. These guidelines could also save the society the money spent on costly
litigations and allow pregnant women to avoid emotional and physical distress
during their pregnancies. An unfortunate limitation of this policy could occur if a
state adopts policies that do not support the women’s rights. Pregnant women in this
state would be forced into difficult decisions: should they continue to see their
doctors and risk being forced to undergo an unwanted treatment? Should they avoid
prenatal care and deliver the baby at home? Should they travel to another state that
has more favorable laws? Nonetheless, having specific laws would allow women to
know their rights and make decisions accordingly.
Finally, the federal government could issue a national referendum concerning
women’s rights during pregnancy. A national law is unlikely, as states are generally
allowed to make their own guidelines regarding such issues. A national committee
would consult the American Medical Association and other medical bodies for
guidance as to what policies are most medically sound. The U.S. Supreme Court
could agree to hear a case of forced medical treatment to determine whether the court
order infringed on a woman’s Constitutional rights. A Supreme Court ruling would
provide the ultimate ruling about whether a hospital can force a pregnant woman to
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have a medical procedure. Until such time, the other policies will help women make
the best personal decisions.
These policy suggestions would be beneficial in a number of ways. Women
would be informed of their rights and be able to make informed choices concerning
their medical care. They would avoid any emotional discomfort that accompanies the
uncertainty of not knowing their rights. Medical personnel could make employment
decisions based on the hospital’s policies; this would reduce the chances of being
involved in an uncomfortable situation. Sudden court battles and costly litigations
could be avoided.
VI. CONCLUSION
As indicated in a number of cases, state courts vary in their opinions concerning
the protection of pregnant women’s rights. If the life or well-being of a fetus is
endangered, the court may authorize a medical treatment regardless of a pregnant
woman’s objections or preferences. Some courts perceive the mother’s
Constitutional rights as absolute whereas other courts subordinate these rights to fetal
rights.110 Some courts have forced pregnant women to undergo invasive medical
procedures, such as a cesarean section or a blood transfusion, when the life of a
viable fetus was endangered.111 Some courts have determined that the surgery should
be carried out because it is a relatively invasive procedure.112 In many cases, judges
have issued rulings based on the state’s compelling interest in protecting the life of a
fetus.113 In contrast, courts that have protected pregnant women’s rights have
determined that a mother’s rights are absolute.114 In some instances, judges
characterized a blood transfusion as an invasive medical procedure that should not be
forced.115
Discrepancy among state court rulings does not provide any guidelines for
pregnant women whether the law protects their constitutional rights or overrides
them. Court-ordered invasive medical procedures may alter women’s lives to a great
extent. Pregnant women may avoid prenatal care which can jeopardize the health and
life of both the mother and the fetus. In order to avoid forceful medical treatments,
pregnant women may have to access costly medical out-of-insurance care or travel a
great distance. Forced medical treatment may also negatively affect the patientprovider relationship by creating mistrust.
This article provided an analysis of pregnant women’s rights to refuse invasive
medical treatment based on inconsistencies among different state laws and different
state court rulings. Most state courts issued their opinions on a case-by-case basis
which contributes to the inconsistency. This discrepancy creates chaos in the law and
inflicts unnecessary suffering upon pregnant women. The policy suggestions offered
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here should help reduce the inconsistency for women, the medical profession, and
the legal profession. Women will be certain of their rights, and doctors will be
certain of their efficacy to force treatments. As a result, the negative outcomes
discussed here can be reduced.

